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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
In response to a request from the House of Representatives Committee on Science,
Space, and Technology in its Report No. 102-500 of April 22, 1992, the Aerospace Safety
Advisory Panel (ASAP) created an ad hoc task force to conduct a thorough assessment of
the Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME). The membership was drawn mostly from organizations
other than ASAP, and this report represents the views of that task force. Its task was to assess
the risk that the SSME poses to the safe operation of the Space Shuttle, to identify and evaluate
improvements to the engine that would reduce the risk, and to recommend a set of priorities
for the implementation of these improvements.
The SSME Assessment Team, as it opted to call itself, convened in mid-1992 and,
subsequently, met with and gathered information from all the principal organizations involved
in the SSME program. These included the Rocketdyne Division of Rockwell International,
the Marshall Space Flight Center of NASA, and the Pratt & Whitney Division of United
Technologies Corporation. The information in this report reflects the Program status as of
October 1992. From the information received, the Team formed its conclusions and
recommendations. Changes in the program status have, of course, occurred since that time;
however, they did not affect the Team's conclusions and recommendations.
Background
The constraints on weight, dimensions, and performance, as well as the requirement
of reusability, were significant drivers in the design of the SSME. They led to the selection
of the staged-combustion engine thermodynamic cycle and system pressures as high as 7,900
psi, about three times as high as earlier rocket engines. The pressure levels and allowable
system weight resulted in turbomachinery with unprecedented power-to-weight ratios, as high
as 100 horsepower per pound. Weight limitations also led to extensive use of welds and high-
strength materials in the structure of the engine. By all accounts, the SSME is a marvel of
engineering achievement but fraught with problems resulting from a highly sensitive, interactive
cycle and ultra-lightweight design.
The development program had a history replete with problems, not unlike other rocket
engine development programs. The original plan to conduct turbopump component-level
development tests had to be abandoned because of difficulty in manufacturing components
on schedule as well as major failures of component test facilities. As a consequence, the
first article was diverted from component- to engine-level tests. The high-pressure turbopumps
proved to be the most intractable components and were the cause of many failures, although
other components contributed to development difficulties and delays. After the difficulties
were assessed, the original objective of certifying the SSME for operation at 109 percent of
rated power level (RPL), also called flail power level (FPL), was deferred. Instead, certification
at RPL became the objective for the first manned orbital flight (FMOF) engine and was
ultimately achieved.
A series of three improvement programs followed, ultimately aimed at achieving the
original objective of certification at FPL and 55 mission life. Many design changes were
incorporated, and the engine achieved certification for operation at 104 percent RPL albeit
with many precautionary controls and restrictions such as special inspections and severe service
life limitations on many parts. After the Challenger accident, the safety and operating margins
of the entire Shuttle system were re-examined and additional changes were incorporated into
the SSME. Also, the power-level objective was formally changed to 104 percent RPL with
operation at FPL to be employed only in the event of a"contingency abort." The configuration
resulting from this effort still required the numerous precautionary controls noted above.
Assessment of Safety
To assess the safety of the SSME, the Team reviewed the results of the most recent
Hazard Analysis, Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and resulting Critical Items
List (CIL), and Reliability Analyses. In addition, the design and operating margins attributed
to engine components were reviewed as well as the methodology of the precautionary controls
imposed on the system.
The analyses were thorough and comprehensive. They identified hazards and failure
modes and documented the rationales for accepting risks along with controls and precautions
being applied to mitigate risks involved for the items on the CIL. Although some parts and
components do not meet the specification requirements, operating margins are provided by
means of precautions such as service life limits and special inspections. Systems are in place
and operating, therefore, to provide assurance that the hardware will not exceed its limits
as they are understood.
Reliability analyses of systems that continue to change and evolve are notoriously subject
to criticism because they lack statistical and mathematical "purity." Nonetheless, such analyses
can provide insight into the order of magnitude of system reliability and its trends with time
and hardware improvements. Rocketdyne and MSFC independently performed such analyses
using the data base from engine tests and flights. The two organizations employed different
mathematical methodologies as well as ground rules for inclusion of data. Remarkably, the
results of the two are similar: for a 3-engine duster, the probability of encountering an engine
shutdown (a contained failure) operating at 104 percent RPL is about 1 in 45 flights; the
probability of an uncontained (Criticality-l) failure is about 1 in 120 flights. The contained
failures will result in the use of an intact abort mode planned for such eventuality so that
crew and vehicle will be saved. The consequence of an uncontained failure cannot be predicted,
but can easily result in an abort with loss of vehicle or, worse, loss of crew and vehicle. Because
the analyses cannot and do not take into account the effects of all the special controls and
precautions currently taken with the engines prior to dearing them for flight, the Team believes
that the actual single flight reliability of the engine is higher than the numbers would indicate.
That consideration, coupled with flight experience, leads the Team to consider that the engine
is safe to fly n provided the system of controls is applied vigorously and rigorously.
Proposed Improvements
The foregoing notwithstanding, operating experiences and the continuing occurrence
of hardware problems indicate that the SSME is not as rugged as is desired for such a machine.
Also, the manpower consumed in executing all the precautions and controls certainly adds
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substantially to the recurring costs of using the engine. A number of major improvements
to the engine, designed to overcome its shortcomings, are in various states of development.
They are: single-tube heat exchanger, alternate high-pressure turbopumps, large-throat main
combustion chamber, and two-duct powerhead. The Team reviewed the designs and development
history and state of each of these components. The designs respond to the known performance,
safety, and manufacturing problems of the components they are to replace and, if they achieve
their objectives, will greatly enhance engine reliability and safety. Each component has
encountered developmental problems that appeared to have been largely overcome at the
time of this review. The Team encourages the completion of these developments and their
incorporation into the fleet. But because of budgetary and other problems over the course
of the years, improvements have been undertaken in a serial fashion, and the current plans
for development and certification are not as efficient and coherent as they might be. Detailed
consideration should be given to altering the plans so as to effect a "block change" incorporating
all these modifications at once.
Conclusions and Recommendations
In summary, the Team considers that it is safe to fly the SSME provided that all special
controls are scrupulously followed. The safety and reliability of the engine can be improved
substantially by incorporating all of the major changes noted above. These changes will reduce
reliance on people and processes for safety and shift its achievement to the inherent ruggedness
and operating margins of the hardware. If priorities must be imposed, the consensus of the
Team is that, on the basis of safety and reliability impact, the following should prevail:
Priority I: Single-Tube Heat Exchanger
Alternate High-Pressure Oxidizer Turbopump
Large-Throat Main Combustion Chamber
Priority II: Alternate High-Pressure Fuel Turbopump
Two-Duct Powerhead
The changes should be implemented as soon as possible, preferably as a block change
rather than as serial changes proposed in current plans. Based on its collective experience,
the Team believes that the block change approach would be more economical. However,
a detailed study of costs, schedule, and technical aspects of both approaches should be made.
It can be expected that anomalies and new phenomena will continue to occur as operating
and test experience is gained. A competent, sustaining engineering function should be maintained
to ensure thorough investigation of all such occurrences. Efforts to develop improved fabrication
and inspection techniques for the SSME should be continued and encouraged.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In its Report No. 102-500 (see Apt_ndix
A), dated April 22, 1992, on the NASA
Multiyear Authorization Act of 1992, the
House of Representatives Committee on
Science, Space, and Technology requested
that the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel
(ASAP) create a temporary task force of
propulsion experts, including non-ASAP
members, to conduct a thorough assessment
of the Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME).
This task force was requested to: (1) assess
the risk that the SSME poses to the safe
operation of the Space Shuttle; (2) identify
and evaluate engine improvements that
would eliminate or reduce these risks; and
(3) recommend a set of priorities for the
implementation of these improvements.
Such a group was assembled; its
membership is listed in Appendix B. It was
co-chaired by individuals affiliated with the
ASAP, but the majority of the membership
was from other organizations. The group
adopted the name "SSME Assessment
Team."
During the months of July and August
1992, the Team convened at the Rocketdyne
Division of Rockwell International, the
designer and manufacturer of the SSME;
the Marshall Space Flight Center of NASA,
the project management center for the
SSME; and the West Palm Beach, Florida,
facility of the Pratt & Whitney Division of
United Technologies Corporation, designers
and manufacturers of alternate high-pressure
turbopumps for the SSME. At these
meetings, the Team was briefed on the
history and status of each organization's
participation in the SSME program, their
evaluations of the safety and reliability of
the engine system (or their parts thereof),
and descriptions, status, and evaluations of
the hardware improvements on which they
were working or had recommended.
Subsequent to the briefings, the Team
met to review and discuss its findings and
to develop its conclusions and recommenda-
tions. From these Team-only sessions, issues
and further questions arose that were
pursued by individual members and reported
to the entire Team. A consensus was agreed
upon, and report drafts were written,
reviewed, and edited until all members were
satisfied with both content and presentation,
which reflects the Program status of October
1992.
In the course of the abovementioned
process, the Team realized that the
recommendations to be made were
dependent not only on the technical details
and the status of the engine system
improvements currently underway or
proposed, but also on the planned
operational life of the Space Shuttle. In
addition, some operational aspects of the
Shuttle, in particular abort modes, had to
be considered. Any engine improvement
that increases its robustness or permits an
increase in usable thrust level mitigates the
risks associated with aborts. The Team's
views were based on the assumptions that
the Shuttle would continue in service at its
currently planned launch rate beyond the
year 2000 and that engine improvements
that would act to mitigate or eliminate the
need for any abort mode would be consid-
ered. These assumptions are implicit in this
report.
Section H of the report describes the
history of the SSME development and details
current deficiencies. Section HI provides
the findings of the SSME safety assessment,
while Section IV presents proposed engine
improvements. The SSME Assessment
Team's conclusions and recommendations
are contained in Sections V and VI,
respectively.
The Team would like to acknowledge
and express its appreciation for the
cooperation and assistance it received from
all the orgattizations and individuals who
participated in its activities.
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II. BACKGROUND
'1"he Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME)
is the first reusable, computer-controlled,
liquid hydrogen/liquid oxygen rocket engine
of the 500,000-pound thrust class. The
engine is throttleable over the thrust range
from 65 to 109 percent of rated power level
(RPL) and controlled to start, stop, and
maintain a commanded power level and
mixture ratio by an electronic controller.
Three of these engines, clustered in the aft
end of the Space Shuttle Orbiter and
supplied with propellants from the External
Tank, operate for approximately 8.5 minutes
(in parallel, for 2 minutes, with two Solid
Rocket Boosters) to launch the Shuttle into
orbit. The Shuttle is designed such that any
contained engine failure can be safely
overcome by employing one of several abort
modes. In the event of such an engine
failure, some of the abort modes require
the two operating engines to run for up to
14 minutes.
The engine system comprises a number
of major component assemblies (Figure 1).
Among them are: the powerhead, four
turbopumps, two preburners, five hydrauli-
cally operated main propellant valves, a
regeneratively cooled main combustion
chamber and nozzle, dual electronic
controllers, and a main injector. In addition,
there are many fluid lines, ducts, pneumatic
valves, and electrical components and wiring.
In all, an engine is composed of over 11,000
parts.
Figure 1. SSME Components
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DESIGN DRIVERS
The Shuttle system design requirements
of size, weight, performance, and reusability
were significant drivers in the engine design
choices. Shuttle payload requirements led
to the selection of the staged-combustion
engine cycle because it would provide the
highest Specific Impulse (lsp). In this cycle,
combustion of the propellants occurs in two
steps. In the first, most of the hydrogen and
part of the oxygen from the high-pressure
turbopumps are burned in a very fuel-rich
mixture in a pair of relatively small
combustion chambers called preburners.
The products of combustion are ducted to
drive the turbines of the two high-pressure
turbopumps. After exiting the turbines,
these gases pass through the powerhead
tubes to the Main Combustion Chamber
(MCC) injector, where they are mixed with
additional propellants to be burned at very
high temperature (approximately 6,000 R)
and then expanded through the nozzle to
produce thrust. The staged-combustion cycle
is inherently highly interactive in that a small
change in an adjustable parameter such as
a flow or pressure in one part of the system
can have dramatic effects throughout the
engine.
Size limitations, in combination with
the thrust requirement, led to system
pressures as high as 7,900 psi. This is a
factor of three greater than the system
pressure of earlier rocket engines. The
pressure level and the allowable system
weight resulted in turbomachinery with an
unprecedented horsepower-to-weight ratio,
as high as 100 horsepower per pound.
Weight constraints also drove the engine
to employ design choices like: welded instead
of bolted joints, the welding of forged parts
instead of castings to produce complex parts
such as manifolds and volutes, and the use
of high-strength materials. Unfortunately,
the latter are sensitive to hydrogen and re-
quire the use of protective treatment like
coatings, gold plating, or weld overlays. In
summary, the Shuttle system requirements
led to a complex engine design that is
difficult to manufacture and maintain.
DEVELOPMENT HISTORY
The SSME development contract was
signed in August 1972. Initially, develop-
ment was to employ the Design Ve "rtfieation
Specification (DVS) approach, which
requires tests to be performed at the lowest
possible assembly level (e.g., component,
subsystem, system) to demonstrate that
design specifications had been met. In late
1973 and early 1974, numerous problems
such as component facility construction
delays, weight-driven design changes, and
changes to achieve needed structural strength
delayed component fabrication and testing.
This resulted in a decision to divert the first
ardde of each component from planned tests
at the component level to engine-level tests.
For example, engine-level testing of the high-
pressure turbopumps began 3 months before
component-level test began. Subsequently,
a number of component test facility failures
occurred and this, coupled with a very high
rate of hardware attrition in the test pro-
gram, led to a decision to cancel the com-
preheusive turbomachinery level test
program that had been planned.
The engine-level test program required
50 tests, 11 turbopump replacements, and
over 3 months to develop acceptable start
and shutdown sequences and reach 50
percent of rated thrust (minimum power
level). All effort was then directed towards
meeting the specified 109-percent power
level [full power level (FPL)] and 55-flight
system life. In this process, many problems
were encountered; some because of opera-
tion under internal conditions more severe
than those experienced in previous engine
developments. Others were caused by
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manufacturing defects, operational errors,
and the consequences of design assumptions
that proved incorrect. Among the more
significant problems encountered were: High
Pressure Fuel Turbopump (HPFTP) sub-
synchronous whirl (a rotordynamics
phenomenon) and turbine blade failures;
High Pressure Oxidizer Turbopump
(HPOTP) explosions caused by failures of
the inter-propellant seal package and bearing
and of the pre-bumer and MCC injectors.
By April 1981, 19 major engine failures had
occurred.
All failures were subjected to detailed
failure analysis, and corrective actions were
devised and implemented. The elimination
of many instruments and their ports and
bosses to reduce weight led to difficulty in
determining failure causes because data on
internal engine conditions were not available.
Also, became in the uncontained failures
the hardware was consumed by the resulting
fire, conclusive evidence of cause could not
be obtained. Consequently, multiple
changes, identified via faihre-tree analyses,
were incorporated. Although limited to RPL
thrust and severely restricted as to
reusability, the SSME was given pre "hminary
certification in March 1980 for the first
manned orbital flight (FMOF) of the Shuttle.
FLIGHT CONFIGURATIONS
After the travails noted above, it was
decided that the goal of achieving a certified
FPL engine should be deferred and that the
FMOF configuration engine should be
formally certified for RPL. Certification
requirements had been evolving and were
now formally defined to comprise a series
of 13 tests accumulating 5000 seconds of
engine operation. The tests included
multiple runs covering design-mission
profiles, an abort mission profile, and an
"overstress" test at 2 percentage points above
the specified power level. These tests were
to be performed twice on each of two en-
gines, the so-called 2-by-2 rule. This would
qualify the engine configuration for five
flights. A further requirement for achieving
flight clearance was the accumulation of
65,000 seconds of engine operating time.
The FMOF configuration completed
certification in the Fall of 1980 and was used
on the first five Shuttle flights, starting in
April 1981.
A series of three improvement programs
followed in an attempt to achieve the origi-
nal development goals. The first, Phase I,
sought to increase engine service life and
to certify the engine for normal operation
at FPL The many design changes that were
incorporated and tested improved service
life but did not achieve routine operation
at FPL. Instead, the engine was certified
at 104 percent RPL, and this basic
configuration was used from STS-6 through
the Challenger accident. Problems and test
failures continued to occur during this
period, and more special inspections and
pan life limits [Deviation Approval Requests
(DARs)] had to be imposed to preclude
inflight problems.
During this period, a substantial number
of major design changes were proposed to
improve safety margins and service life, and
to achieve FPL for normal operation.
However, budget constraints limited the
scope of the Phase II improvement program.
Particular emphasis was placed on achieving
certification at FPL, reducing the many
inspection and maintenance requirements
(DARs) imposed on the high-pressure
turbopumps, and extending their service lives
to 5,000 seconds. Other detailed design
changes in this program addressed issues
such as mitigating high-cycle fatigue
problems and reducing temperature spikes
during throttle transients.
5
Progress was being made towards these
goals at the time of the Challenger accident.
Subsequently, the safety and operating
margins were re-examined and the Phase
II program was revised. Approximately 40
additional detailed design changes were
added, and the power level target was
changed to 104 percent RPL with FPL
capability in the event of a "contingency
abort" (i.e., to avoid a ditching). FPL
capability was demonstrated during the
certification test program as well as by a
short duration [run] at FPL during each
flight engine acceptance test. The resulting
configuration achieved certification and was
dubbed the "return-to-flight" or Phase II
engine. Although the engine subsequently
accumulated some 90,000 seconds of test
time, it still required frequent removal,
disassembly, and overhaul ofboth high-pres-
sure turbopumps (1 to 3 flights), and a large
array of DARs remained for the entire
engine.
In an attempt to ameliorate the need
for frequent turbopump overhaul, a third
modification program was initiated in 1988.
This was the "10K pump" program, so called
because its objective was to certify both
turbopumps for 10,000 seconds of service
life. The 10K HPFTP achieved a 7-to-8
flight certification in late 1991, was first used
in flight in May 1992, and is now being
incorporated in the fleet. The 10K HPOTP
attempt was less successful; the pump that
resulted (P-HPOTP) still requires pump-end
replacements every 1 to 3 flights and
complete overhaul after 4 to 6 flights.
CURRENT STATUS
The SSME is a highly sensitive machine
whose components must be monitored
closely to ensure their compatibility and
safety. Hundreds of "generic" inspections
are contained in the Orbiter Maintenance
Requirements Specification Document
(OMRSD), all of which require highly
skilled, experienced, and dedicated
technicians to perform them. In addition,
an average of 75 engine-specific inspections
and life limitations are required for each
engine because of the difficulty in building
the parts exactly to drawing requirements.
Some of the variations among parts or sub-
assemblies that have been accepted for use
have performance effects sufficient to require
care and vigilance in the selection of
components for assembly into an engine.
This process results in the selective assembly
of engines.
The foregoing considerations require
the expenditure of many man-hours of effort,
not only to perform the inspections,
overhauls, and requisite acceptance tests,
but also to keep and review the records and
pedigrees of hundreds of parts to assure the
suitability of an engine for flight. Although
the engine is classified "reusable," the term
cannot and must not be employed as is done
with respect to aircraft gas turbine engines.
Known deficiencies have led to steps
to achieve confidence in the hardware.
Design changes to rectify the problems and
to produce more robust hardware have been
under continuous development. These
development activities have been subject
not only to the normal technical problems
of any development, but also to the vagaries
of budget processes that cause interruptions
and discontinuities in the activities.
Despite the reservations that one can
have about the flight-worthiness of engines
that require such detailed care and attention,
they are indeed being used for flight. The
question, "Are they safe?," is ever present
and is addressed in Section III, Assessment
of System Safety.
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III. ASSESSMENT OF SYSTEM SAFETY
System safety assessment is a many-
faceted process that includes performing
Hazard Analyses, Failure Modes and Effects
Analyses (FMEA), and Reliability Analyses;
developing a Critical Items List (CIL); and
examining the design and operating margins
of the components. The safety of the Space
Shuttle Main Engine (SSME) is continuously
addressed by all the organizations involved
and by ad hoe groups from time to time.
A complete safety re-evaltmfion of the SSME
was conducted after the Challenger accident,
and its elements have been subjected to
updating as new information became avail-
able. The SSME Asser_ment Team reviewed
and evaluated the information resulting from
these efforts; its major findings are sum-
marized in this section.
HAZARD ANALYSIS
The Hazard Analysis enumerates all
potentially unsafe conditions or events,
identifies the potential sources of such
conditions, and provides the rationale for
the mitigation and/or acceptance of the
risk involved. The hazard fault tree in
Figure 2 identifies 16 SSME failure modes
that could result in loss of crew and/or
vehicle due to fire and/or explosion. Seven
failure modes are considered controlled
through design, inspection and test, or
demonstrated reliability. Nine are accepted
risks based on analysis and probability of
occurrence. Table 1 is illustrative of the
reasoning and actions taken to mitigate and
control the risks to an acceptable level. The
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Figure 2. Hazard Fault Tree Example
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Hazard
Number
ME-B2
ME-B3
Hazard Tltfo
Risk Issue
FPB bumthrough,
rupture, explosion
• POPS during start
and cutoff
HE)( bumthrough,
rupture, explosion
• Mechanical damage
from foreign objects
• Weld/matsdal
failure
Table 1.
Risk Reduction
Recommendations
Risk Reduction Actions
Program Action To
Reduce Risks
Reduce the hazard
classification from
accepted risk to
controlled
Develop a single coil
heat exchanger design
for the SSME that will
improve the margin of
the flight HE)(
Reduce matedai
inclusions or stringers
Based on thermal/dynarnic analysis and hot fire
history on POPS; the hazard classification for fuel
prabumer POPS will be reduced to controlled
POP data base (1,099 tests, 47 engines) showed no
FPB POPS higher than 6,000 Gp-p
No FPB Faceplate deformation was ever attributed
to a POP
Prebumer POP issue was bdefed to SSRP in
meeting no. 3
Changes to the OMRSD DV41AME.010 (new POP
criteria, magnitude, and time* frame) have been
approved
Single tube heat exchanger (ECP-114330)
• Design in development phase
• Improve tube margin by incremdng tube wall
from 0.0125 and 0.0265 to a uniform 0.032
thickness
ECP 990 requires the use of double vacuum melted
ingot to control impurities in the material. Matedal
process has been incorporated
Single tube heat exchanger (ECP 11433) eliminated
critical weld joints
First unit to be installed on Engine 0220
• Testing is scheduled for August 1992
• Single tube heat exchanger is scheduled for
STS-68 flight
complete Hazard Analysis contains
exhaustive examinations of the hazards
present during each of the several phases
of engine operation from pre-start to
shutdown and, for each phase, addr_ the
contributions of each subsystem to the
hazards of that phase of engine operation
and how they are controlled. This analysis
was thorough and effective.
FAILURE MODES AND EFFECTS
ANALYSIS
The FMEA employs a _Jottom-up" ap-
proach, in contrast to the "top-down"
approach of the Hazard Analysis. It asks,
at the lowest levels of each subsystem, "How
can this device/part fail and what are the
effects and consequences of such a failure
on the component and all other interfacing,
interacting components?" The consequences
of each failure mode identified are dassitied
according to their severity. Failure modes
that could lead to loss of crew and/or vehicle
fall into the "Criticality-l" (CRIT-1)
dassifleation. These items are then collected
on a Critical Items List (CIL). The CIL is
used as a management tool to focus attention
on the mitigation or control of the failure
mode via actions such as redesign, use of
redundancy, and special inspections or tests.
After the Challenger accident, the
Shuttle System FMEA, including the SSME,
was performed again under a more stringent
set of ground rules and at greater depth
than had been used in the original analysis.
Table 2 lists the numbers of CRIT-1 items
on the original and revised CILs. The chan-
ges in the ground rules and depth of analysis
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Table 2. Distribution of CRIT-1
Pre- and Post-51L CILs
Subsystem
Combustion Devices
Turbo Machinery
Pneumatic Controls
Propellant Valves
Actuators
Controllet/Harnessos
Igniters/Sensors
Lines, Ducts, Joints, Orific-
es
Totals
Cummt
CIL
33
Pre-51L
CIL
10
39 15
11 3
39 21
18 1
3 0
23 2
23 21
189 I 73
led to the significant increase in CRIT-1
items. The revised CIL led to the introduc-
tion of over 100 design, software (S/W),
inspection, test, operations, and process
changes in the SSME. Table 3 indicates the
distribution of these changes among the
SSME subsystems. The "top 10" CRIT-1
items of the revised CIL are presented in
Table 4, along with the proposed changes
and their current status. As changes are
Table 3. Distribution of Modifications
ModHtcetkms
Subsystem Oe_a s/w prooem ops
Combustion Devices 22 1 7 10
Turbo Machinery 16 0 2 0
Pneumatic Controls 1 1 0 1
Propellent Valves 0 0 1 2
Actuators 3 0 1 1
Controller/Harnesses 8 25 0 4
Igniters/Sensors 4 0 3 1
Lines, Ducts, Joints, Od- 5 0 1 1
rices
incorporated, this living list is updated as
the risks are mitigated or eliminated.
RELIABILITY
The FMEA and Hazard analyses
identify potential failures. The Reliability
analysis determines the probability of failure
occurrence. There are two ways to estimate
the probability of an engine failure. The
first is to determine or estimate the
reliability of each component and then
combine them mathematically to arrive at
an estimated system reliability. No suitable
reliability data base exists at the component
level for the SSME. Estimating component
reliabilities when truly comparable similar
components do not exist is, at best, not
meaningful and, at worst, misleading. This
is the case for the SSME, as no data for
components with similar operating conditions
can be found on which to base calculations.
The second approach is to use and analyze
available engine-level test and failure data
statistically. This is the approach that has
been employed independently by both
Rocketdyne and MSFC.
Statistically valid reliability calculations
require an extensive data base. Purists can
argue, with merit, that the test and flight
data on the SSME are limited and, therefore,
results of reliability calculations are suspect.
Nonetheless, some 62 flight-configuration
engines (albeit of differing configurations)
have been hot-fired for a cumulative
operating time of 462,567 seconds
(equivalent to approximately 900 missions)
as of the time of this writing. Although
these data do not satisfy the conditions
required for mathematically pure reliability
calculations, they certainly provide a base
for developing useful estimates of the range
of reliability of the SSME and of reliability
trends with time, provided all the
assumptions, limitations, and caveats are
taken into account.
9
Table 4. Top 10 FEMA/CII. Components
Rank Component Failure Mode
Heat exchanger HE)( coil fracture
or leakage
2 High pressure fuel Turbine blade
turbopump structural failure
Design/Mfg. Process
Improvements
Single coil HE)( eliminates
interpropeltent welds and increases
wail thickneu. Simplified assy
technique and tooling. State-of-art-
tube inspection equipment
Status
Cert. Flight
1OKpump improvements; blade
pocket and assembly fit checks.
Computer tomogrephy inspection
High pressure Turbine piece part 1st stage disc pilot rib redesign and
oxidizer turbopump structural failure modified tip seal retainers
Ranned FY 94
FY93
4 Hot gas system Leakage
joint G15
5 High pressure Turbine blade
oxidizer turbopump structural failure
6 High pressure Loss of support,
oxidizer turbopump position control,
or rotordynarnic
stability
7 Oxidizer prebumer Falls to respond
oxidizer valve to position
actuator commands
8 LPFTP discharge Falls to contain
duct hydrogen
g Nozzle assembly External rupture
Complete STS-4S
10 High pressure Loss of axial
oxidizer turbopump balancing force
Comp_te STS-49
Converted 14 welds to robotic Complete STS-45
Added flow rec_rculation inhibitor and Complete STS-34
joint effective gap measurement
Modified tip seal retainers and Complete STS-45
improved damper inspection
Improved bearing drying and added Complete STS-31
weld 3 strain gages
Added improved clearance In-process FY 94
measurements and functional FY 93
threshold test
Added corrosion inhibitor
Improved tripod radius inspections
Complete STS-28
Complete STS-41R
Eliminated 18 critical welds on
Steerhorn and feedlines
FY 94 TBD
Complete STS-45Added improved silver seal bottoming
and retainer ring inspections
Rocketdyne Analysis. This reliability
analysis used a binomial model for equiv-
alent mission profiles. This approach
accounts for the different power levels of
operation and treats failures as random and
independent. By using a "redesign
effectiveness factor" for the changes of
reliability effected by implementing design
changes subsequent to a failure, the effects
of engine configuration changes over time
are taken into account. Rocketdyne
calculations using the test and flight
history of the SSME yield the results shown
in Table 5 for a three-engine cluster with
an assumed 0.5 redesign effectiveness factor
(a conservative assumption). For a typical
flight at 104 percent RPL the calculations
indicate that a CRIT-1 failure may be
expected every 139 flights and an engine
infiight shutdown every 45 flights. The effect
of increasing power level above 104 percent
RPL is marked. At FPL (109 percent), a
CRIT-1 failure can be expected every 20
flights and an inflight shutdown every 8
flights. If a 1.0 design effectiveness factor
is assumed (i.e., the failure mechanism is
10
Table 5. SSME Reliability (3 Engines)
W_dha 0.5 Redesign Effectiveness Factor
Engine
Operating
Phase
Uftoff
Mainstage
100% RPL
104% RPL
109% RPL
Rights Between Incident
SSME Safe
Shutdown
42
112
45
8.3
CRIT-1
Failure
363
254
139
2O
fully eliminated), the 104 percent RPL
numbers become 336 and 120 for CRIT-1
and shutdown, respectively. The number
of flights between these types of failures
most probably lies somewhere between these
two sets of numbers.
MSFC Analysis. The Marshall Space
Flight Center (MSFC) made independent
calculations of the reliability of the SSME
using the same data base as Rocketdyne,
but with slightly different ground rules
governing which data to include. MSFC
used the U.S. Army Material System
Analysis Activity reliability growth model
for its calculations. In this model, the data
input is the number of failures as a function
of cumulative test time. These data are
curve-fit to an exponential function that
feeds into the reliability calculations. The
use of the exponential function to convey
reliability growth serves a purpose similar
to the redesign effectiveness factor in the
Rocketdyne methodology. The MSFC
analysis yields 118 as the number of flights
between CRIT-1 failures at 104 percent and
48 for a safe engine shutdown. These
numbers are roughly comparable to those
resulting from the Rocketdyne analysis with
a 0.5 effectiveness.
either by hardware or procedural changes
as appropriate. Nonetheless, unanticipated
failures continue to occur; some because
the changes do not fully eliminate the causal
factor(s), others because of incomplete or
inexact comprehension of internal loads and
environments. Figure 3 shows the engine
failures experienced as a function of time.
Prior to 1985, testing was conducted at a
rate of approximately 33,300 seconds per
year. From 1979 to 1985, the mean time
between failures was about 8,000 seconds.
Starting about 1987, the test rate increased
to about 43,000 seconds per year and, for
the period from about 1987 to 1990, the
mean time between failures increased to
about 18,000 seconds, indicating an increase
in reliability. Most recently, however, from
about 1990 to mid-1992, the mean time be-
tween failure dropped to about 9,000
seconds. Thus, although overall experience
would indicate that the reliability of the
SSME is increasing, it is not possible to
predict when failures will occur.
It must be recognized, however, that
the abovementioned failures occur on the
test stand and include new and rebuilt
hardware as well as modified hardware
under development. Flight hardware is
subject to myriad special inspections,
acceptance tests, and servicing between
missions. Also, the components and parts
are constrained to use well below their
demonstrated service life expectancy.
Further, redline limits are imposed to
minimize the risk of catastrophic failure by
shutting down the malfunctioning engine and
then employing an abort mode to save crew
and vehicle. Some of these controls are
described below.
HARDWARE MARGINS AND LIFE
LIMITS
As noted, both types of analyses account
for the effects of reliability improvements
The SSME Contract End Item (CEI)
specifications stipulate structural design
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Figure 3. Engine Failure Rate and Accumulated Test Time
criteria, certification test requirements, and
fatigue life design criteria. These and other
requirements are intended to ensure engine
reliability and safety. Originally, the design
objective was that the engine would be
capable of 55 starts and 27,000 seconds of
run time. Recent changes made in the
specifications now require 30 starts and
15,000 seconds run time for all components
other than high-pressure turbopumps and
flexible ducts. The latter must be capable
of 20 starts and 10,000 seconds run time.
Engineering analysis and component tests
are used to establish structural margins of
safety and to verify that fatigue life satisfies
criteria. However, several engine
components do not meet, much less exceed,
all the CEI requirements. To ensure that
operating matins exist, life limits, special
inspections, and other criteria and limits are
imposed.
Design Margins. Specifications for the
design of SSME components require the use
of structural factors of safety of 10 percent
above yield strength and 40 percent above
ultimate strength of the materials employed.
Also, life factors for both Low Cycle and
High Cycle fatigue properties are stipulated
to ensure margin for component life require-
ments. To account for unavoidable
variations in material properties, dimensions,
and loads, the design analyses are made
using minimum material properties, worst
12
case dimensions, and maximum expected
loads. Of course, the designs are only as
good as the knowledge of these factors. In
1988, a thorough structural review of the
SSME for some 1,735 major parts identified
over 250 parts requiring additional analyses
or tests. These were performed, and where
indicated, design changes were incorporated.
Operating Margins. To ensure the
flight safety of components that do not satisfy
CEI requirements, additional limits and
inspections are placed on them using the
DAR procedure. Table 6 presents the cur-
rent generic life and inspection limits
controlled by DAR. These data apply to
the entire SSME inventory. In addition to
these generic DARs, there are engine-and
component-unique DARs, such as shown
in Table 7 for engine 2027. Such unique
limits are required because of the difficulty
ofreproducibly manufacturing engine parts
with consistent design margins or perfor-
mance charactedstics.
Another method employed to ensure
adequate operating margin is the "Fleet
Leader" criterion. This criterion stipulates
Table 6. SSME Component Generic DAR Umita
Component
HPOTP (Life Limits)
First Stage Disc
Pump End Beadngs
Turbine End Bearings
Turbine Beadng Preload Spring
First Stage Blades
Second Stage Blades
HPOTP (Inspection Limits)
Second Stage Nozzle
First Stage Nozzle
Housing
Impeller
HPFTP (Life Limits)
First and Second Stage Blades
Thermal Shield
HPFTP (Inspection Limits)
First and Second Stage Nozzles
Engine
Starts
14
21
22
11
14
10
13
17
15/10
Accumulated
Run Time
m
2000 sec
2568 sec
3442 EFPL sec
5000 sec
5391
o
540O sec
4300 sec
Impeller
KeI-F Seal
Housing
LPFTP (Inspection Limits)
Volute
Pressure Sensors (Life Limits)
OPOV Seal (Inspection Limit)
10
Unscheduled
Engine Cutoff
5500 sec
5500 sec
3425 EFPL sec
11400 sec
1.5-5 sec
EFPL - Equivalent Full Power Level.
* 10k configuration.
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Table 7. Engine 2027 Unique Inspection Umits
Nozzle Dye penetrant inspect aft manifold every test
MCC assembly Borescope weld 19 after every test
G15 bellows seal Replace seal after every 2 flights
HPFTP Inspect curvic teeth every 11 starts
First and second stage discs Dye penetrant and eddy current every 30 starts
Housing Borescope T/E coolant holes every 10 starts
HPOTP
Housing
Inspect at intervals not exceeding 5512 sec
Borescope inspect limit to one flight
that a component cannot b¢ used for flight
if its accumulated service life exceeds 50
percent of the maximum accumulated
operating time or staxts of a comparable
component,thusproviding operatingmargin.
Finally, operating margin is provided
by imposing redlines both on the ground and
inflight. These redlines are designed to
initiate engine shutdown prior to operation
in a manner that could lead to a catastrophic
failure. During engine start on the launcher,
if any of the redlines is exceeded, the
controller will shut down the engine and will
not issue the permissives required for Solid
Rocket Motor ignition. During flight, if a
redline is exceeded, the controller will shut
down that engine and the crew will have to
fly the appropriate abort mode.
Although the Reliability analyses
indicate that the probability of encountering
a CRIT-1 failure during ascent is of the
order of I in 120, or 1 in 45 for an engine
shutdown, the data base used for these
calculations include both development test
runs and certification runs. Also, all special
precautions represented by added
inspections, more frequent inspections, life
limits, and so on serve to increase the actual
reliability of the flight unit. The actual
reliability cannot be stipulated or stated
precisely. But, as long as all these controls
areimplonentedinan disciptined,and
vigilant manner, the engine can be considered
safe to fly.
ABORT OPTIONS
In the event that an engine failure does
occur despite all the precautions taken, a
final safety feature in the Space Shuttle
system -- the aborts m can be activated.
Some engine failures can be "contained,"
that is, no debris escapes the engine and the
engine is shut down without collateral
damage to other Shuttle systems. Other fail-
ures may be "uncontained," with debris
escaping the engine's confines and probably
damaging other systems or engines. The
latter is called "catastrophic" as there is a
high probability, but no certainty, that it
would cause loss of vehicle and crew.
Failure of an SSME during ascent will
cause the crew to initiate one of two abort
modes depending on when, during ascent,
the failure occurs. The modes are: intact
aborts in which it is possible to achieve orbit
or return vehicle and crew to a pre-selected
landing site; or, a contingency abort which
provides the opportunity to maintain vehicle
integrity and control for inflight crew escape.
A contingency abort is usually indicated
when a second engine failure occurs; a
situation that would require expert piloting.
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No abort mode can be executed prior to
Solid Rocket Booster separation.
Among the intact abort types are: Abort
to Orbit, Abort Once Around, TransAtlantic
Landing and Return to Launch Site (RTLS).
The names are descriptive of what is entailed
except for the RTLS abort, which requires
dissipation of propellants, a powered
turnaround including flying backward, an
atypical jettison of the External Tank, and
a landing near the launch site. RTLS is a
quite complicated maneuver that requires
very skillful piloting and flying through
previously unexperienced flight conditions.
15

IV. PROPOSED IMPROVEMENTS
Operating experiences and the
continuing occurrence of hardware problems
indicate that the Space Shuttle Main Engine
(SSME) in its present configuration does
not have the ruggedness that is desired for
so critical an element of the Space Shuttle
system. It requires continuous expert and
disciplined labor to gain the confidence in
the hardware needed to commit a set of
engines to a flight. In recognition of this
situation and with intimate knowledge of
the weaknesses of the engine, the SSME
Project has, over the years, initiated the
development and certification of a number
of individual major design changes to the
engine. The objectives of these changes are
to make the engine more robust (increasing
margins); to eliminate, or mitigate to
a great extent, the more worrisome of
the Criticality- 1 (CRIT- 1) failure modes; and
to improve the ability to manufacture the
hardware exactly to print. This would shift
engine safety from its current great
dependence on people and procedures to
inherent and reproducible properties of the
hardware. Some of these changes have
reached the certification test stage. Others
are in earlier stages of development. The
candidate _ments are discussed below.
SINGLE-TUBE HEAT EXCHANGER
The current heat exchanger (HEX)
(Figure 4), which converts liquid oxygen to
gaseous oxygen for pressurizing the External
Tank (ET) oxygen tank and the POGO
OXIDIZER PREBURNER
INTERFACE
HOT-GAS MANIFOLD LI_
SECONDARY TUBES_
TUBESUPPORTBRACKET
HOT GAS FLOW
TO MAIN INJECTOR
FLOW VANES
BYPASS
ORIRCE
GOX TO VEHICLE
OXIDIZER
FROM
ANTI-FLOOD
VALVE
HEAT EXCHANGER
OUTER SHELL
(HOT-GAS MANIFOLD
INTERFACE)
_""" HIGH-PR ESSU R E
TUBE OXIDIZER
TURBOPUMP
ATTACH FLANGE
BYPASS LINE
Figure 4. Heat Exchanger Assembly
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suppression subsystem, continues to head
the list of CRIT-1 components for the
SSME. The heat exchanger is located in
the oxidizer side of the Hot Gas Manifold
(HGM) in the path of turbine exhaust gases
from the High Pressure Oxidizer Turbolmmp
(HPOTP) that provide the heat needed to
effect the change of state of the liquid
oxygen.
Salient features of the current two-tube
HEX and the proposed single-robe
replacement are shown in Figure 5. The
current HEX consists of a primary tube, a
bifurcation joint, and two secondary tubes.
The source of safety concern is the existence
of seven critical welds in the oxygen-
containing thin-walled (as thin as 0.0125
inches) tubes that isolate the oxygen from
the fuel-rich hot gases. It is difficult
to control welding and these welds cannot
be fully inspected. Should one of the welds
fail, the consequence would be rapid, uncon-
trolled combustion in the HGM leading to
a bumthrough or explosion. The single-tube
HEX has no welds exposed to the hot gases,
and its tube wall thickness is a much more
rugged 0.032 inch. The structural advantages
of this design are evident from Table 8.
Further, 30 welds were eliminated from the
assembly and all remaining welds were
designed so that critical flaw sizes can be
detected and the welds can be fully
inspected.
Such a redesigned HEX had been
proposed for a long time; however, the
technology to produce the very long (40 feet)
jointless tube of the appropriate material
has only recently been developed. Incorpo-
Inlet
To Bypass
Orifice #
Outlet
al_ Outlet
From Bypass
Orifice
Inlet _Seal _Wall
To Bypass
Orifice
Taper
41.3 tt
0.50 OD x 0.032 W
Constant ID
Single Tubs
Single Tube I
Heat Exchanger I
__.al
°°"--qU
From Bypass
All Interpropellant Welds Eliminated Orifice
Figure 5. Single-Tube Heat Exchanger and Current Bifurcated HEX
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Table S. Single-Tube Heat Exchanger
Structural Margins
(FPL Engine Conditions)
Factor of
Safety
Single-Tube
HEX
Endurance
Bifurcated
HEX
3.2
Yield 1.5 1.3
Ultimate 5.0 3.9
1.2
ration of the new HEX will certainly reduce
the amount of time currently expended in
paimtaki_ postltight mass_ectrometer leak
testing to ensure the integrity of the inter-
propellant welds and tubing. This
modification has been installed on an engine
and is scheduled to enter certification testing.
PRATr & WHITNEY ALTERNATE
TURBOPUMPS
As indicated earlier in this report, the
most challenging and troublesome
components of the SSME are the high-
pressure turbopumps. Engine system
requirements led to discharge pressure levels
of about 8,000 psi for the oxygen pump and
6,000 psi for the fuel pump. The weight and
size constraints led to lightweight, high-
speed, high-temperature and high-efficiency
designs. For example, the High Pressure Fuel
Turbopump (HPFTP) uses a two-stage
turbine with uncooled blades at a turbine
inlet temperature in excess of 2,000 R to
produce about 70,000 horsepower at 36,000
rpm to drive the hydrogen pump. This
machine is of the size and weight of an
automobile engine but produces the
horsepower equivalent of 28 diesel locomo-
fives. The HPOTP rum at about 26,000 rpm
to produce over 28,000 horsepower.
The current machines have been
difficult to manufacture repeatably and have
been the source of many of the test failures
experienced, including uncontained failures.
In ground test, there were 42 engine failures.
Of these, 8 were attributable to the
turbopumps; 1 during the start phase and
7 during steady operation, 3 of which were
catastrophic. In the SSME CIL, 14 of the
top 25 items are associated with the
turbopumps (testing has validated the
ranking). Moreover, the turbopumps require
extensive inspections and frequent removal
for overhaul and consequent retest.
As noted earlier, the current
turbopumps have been the subject of a series
of major improvement programs, the latest
being the "IOK"progranx This program had
more success with the HPFTP than with the
HPOTP. The latter is limited to one to
three flights before removal for overhaul
because of bearing wear indications. The
HPFTP, which met the 10K objective and
is permitted seven to eight flights before
overhaul, still requires very detailed
inspectionsbetween flightsand extreme care
during manufacture. The welded "sheet
metal" construction employed in the
HPFTP's complex flow paths continues to
limit the turbopump's life and to be a high-
maintenance item requiring frequent removal
for crack repair. Also, a recently discovered
turbine blade material quality problem
requires computer tomography screening
of all blades.
Remedies were sought to address the
continuing problems with the turbopumps
prior to the initiation of the 10K program.
In 1985, it was concluded that, within the
constraints presented by the existing designs,
no group of physically possible modifications
could produce the more rugged, reproduc-
ible, and reliable machines needed. A
decision was made to design and develop
a new set of high pressure turbopumps.
These pumps were not to be burdened with
the weight restrictions imposed on the
existing machines and the designs were to
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be responsiveto the lessons learned from
the experiences of more than a decade with
the current turbopumps. Pratt & Whitney
(P&W) was selected to develop the new
machines, which are referred to as the
"Alternate Turbopumps." The major objec-
tives and design differences between the
current and the alternate turbopumps are
given in Table 9. Of particular note are:
115 percent RPL as the design point, the
use of singie-crystal turbine blades, the use
of advanced precision castings instead of
built-up welded sheet metal for complex
parts, and the elimination of coatings against
hydrogen embrittlement by use of improved
materials. In addition, the machines are
designed to contain a turbine blade failure
and enhance the probability of a safe
shutdown.
Table 9. Alternate
Turbopump Design Approach
• incorporate lessons learned with emphasis
on increased safety margins
• Jn_easa porformanco and structural margins
• Utilize 115% power level for maximum
design condition
• Utilize single-orystal blades
• Eliminate welds and sheet metal
• Eliminate thermal and hydrogen environment
coatings
• Reduce number of rotating parts (50%)
• Provide safe shutdown in event of turbine
blade failure
• Design for inspectability, producibility, and
operability
The Alternate Turbopump Program
(ATP) employs the Design Verification
Specification (DVS) methodology with its
extensive testing at the subcornponent level.
In addition, use of a turbopump assembly
hot-fire facility permits exploration and
characterization of the operating map of
each machine separately, prior to turbopump
operation on an engine. Another advantage
of these machines is their careful design for
maintainability; thus allowing a turbopump
to be disassembled and rebuilt in about 2
weeks in contrast to the 4 to 5 weeks
required for the current turbopumps.
The program has not proceeded as
smoothly as had been anticipated; as in any
such development, problems have arisen that
have caused delays. The nature of the more
significant problems encountered for each
machine and the status as of this writing are
given below.
HP(Y_. The current t-IK)TP has been
the most troublesome turbopump on the
engine. The major design features of the
ATP HPOTP are contrasted with those of
the current HPOTP in Table 10. Once
developed, the new machine should be much
more rugged than its predecessor. Testing
at the engine level began in late 1991.
Unfortunately, the new machine ran into
a number of problems, including turbine
inlet cracking, turbine bellows failure,
turbine bearing outer race cracking and,
most intractable, high synchronous vibration
of the rotor assembly. The inlet problem
resulted from a previously unrecognized
adverse radial temperature gradient (400
to 600 R) in the gases from the engine
preburner. The next two problems were
attributed to a manufacturing problem.
Corrective actions were devised for these
and implemented.
The synchronous vibration problem has
been under study for 1-1/2 years. Several
attempts to correct the problem during that
period proved unsuccessful. A multi-
organizational team of experts in rotor
dynamics was formed to resolve the problem,
and a systematic approach led to the
incorporation of several HPOTP design
detail changes. Since then, the HPOTP has
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Table 10. Summary of HPOTP Features
Objective
Minimize welds through fine gain investment
castings
Alternate Turbopump
7
Current
300
Eliminate uninspectable welds None 250
Provides subcritical rotordynamic operation
Stiffen rotor system Integral Tiebolt/Disk Shaft coupled to 1st
disk, bolted to 2nd disk
Minimize rotating elements 28 50
Provide significant suction (NPSP) margin 40% Marginal
Minimize LOX cooled bearings 1 4
Eliminate coatings/closeouts required for None Gold coating/weld
hydrogen embrittlement protection closeouts
Reduce shaft RPM 22400 28000
demonstrated, in engine-level tests, over
5,700 seconds of satisfactory operation at
104 percent RPL. Thesewere accumulated
in some 24 tests including 9 mission duration
runs. The only untoward finding from these
runs was greater-than-expected wear in a
bearing. Some changes to the bearing
support structure should solve this problem.
Testing at FPL and the accumulation of
additional development test time in the final
configuration must occur before certification
of the HPOTP can begin. Certification
testing is currently scheduled to begin in the
Spring of 1993 and to be completed in mid-
1994.
HPFTP. The features of the P&W
HPFTP and the existing 10K HPFTP are
compared in Table 11. As in the case of
the HPOTP, the new machine should be
much more rugged and durable. Engine-
level testing of the ATP HPFTP began in
May 1991. The mrbopump demonstrated
ability to operate at 109 percent RPL and
accumulated 2200 seconds of operation
during 23 tests at several power levels.
These development tests revealed several
design deficiencies. Among them were:
cracking of the turbine inlet that was
associated with thermal transients, lift-off
seal leakage, ball bearing inner race cracks,
and a high-cycle fatigue crack at the comer
of a second-stage turbine blade. These
problems were investigated and corrective
actions were developed and implemented
in all cases except the blade crack. The
efficacy of these fixes was demonstrated
during a number of runs. The blade crack
fix could not be demonstrated at that time
because it involves changing the number of
second stage stator vanes from 54 to 76,
which requires a new casting, and has a
longer lead-time than the other changes.
In December 1991, the HPFTP program
was placed on hold for 2 years because of
budgetary constraints and to concentrate
development resources on the more critical
and difficult problems of the I-IPOTP. Since
then, an IR&D-funded HPFTP was tested
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Summary of HPFTP Features
Objective Alternate Turbopump Current (1OK Config.)
III
Minimize welds through fine gain investment None 469
castings
Eliminate uninspectable welds None 315
Rotordynamic control
Stiffen rotor system Integral Tiebolt/Disk
14
Shaft coupled to 1st
disk, bolted to 2nd disk
Table 11.
Minimize rotating elements 30
Provide significant suction (NPSP) margin 90% 15%
Eliminate turbine blade thermal barrier coating None NICRALY
through single crystal alloy
at the MSFC Technology Test Bed (TYB)
engine facility (a highly instrumented SSME)
to determine ff the modified pump would
cause any engine system effects over the
operating envelope of the SSME. During
the three test runs, the HPFTP was operated
over the extremes of allowable inlet
conditions, power levels (up to FPL), and
mixture ratios. No adverse engine system
effects were observed.
In smnmary, the ATP designs represent
a significant improvement in the inherent
design margins and durability of the current
turbopumps. These margins have been
enhanced through the elimination of welds
and "sheet metal" construction, reduction
in the number of rotating parts, and elimi-
nation of protective coatings for thermal and
hydrogen embrittlement effects. Moreover,
the design for inspectability and main-
tainability permits simple and rapid
turbopump assembly and disassembly. The
design is such that, with manufacturing
techniques employed, it is possible to
produce hardware within drawing re-
quirements repeatably. The "price" for
obtaining these improved turbopumps, aside
from fiscal, is a reduction in Shuttle payload
capability of 900 pounds due to the increased
engine weight.
The completion of the development
program and the certification testing still
remains. The 2-year hiatus in the HPFTP
program can only be detrimental to the
achievement of the goal of a set of rugged,
reliable turbopumps for the SSME and may
also increase costs because of program
stretch-out and duplicate certification testing.
LARGE THROAT
MAIN COMBUSTION CHAMBER
As noted earlier in this _eport, the
chamber pressure required for the SSME
is several times that of any large rocket
engine developed previously. In combination
with the staged-combustion cycle, this drives
the turbomachinery and other system
pressures to new heights as well. Anything
that reduces these pressures while retaining
thrust and specific impulse levels also serves
to reduce the internal operating conditions
and to increase the operating margins of
engine components, their durability and
reliability. Certainly , such changes would
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be of great import to the turbomachines as
well other system components.
As early as 1981, the SSME Project
proposed that an increase fn the throat
diameter of the Main Combustion Chamber
(MCC), along with some other modifications
to the main combustion system, could
provide the desired relief for the
turbomachinery operating environment This
modification was not approved as part of
the SSME improvement program, but was
relegated to a "technology" activity status
with minimal resources. Only recently has
the Large Throat MCC (LTMCC) become
an integral element of the safety and
reliability improvement program.
The MCC is a cylindricalby symmetrical,
regeneratively cooled pressure vessel that
contains the high-temperature (6,000 R)
burning propellant gases and initiates their
expansion through the integral chamber
throat before they enter the nozzle. The
MCC uses part of the liquid hydrogen
discharged from the HPFTP as a coolant
to maintain the MCC internal wall
temperature within acceptable limits. Forced
convection cooling is the primary method
for cooling the wall and is obtained by
channeling the hydrogen through a large
number of rectangular cooling slots within
the chamber wall. Convective cooling is
supplemented by providing film cooling to
the interior (or hot) wall by injecting jets
of hydrogen along the wall through small
holes in the main injector face plate.
The LTMCC differs from the current
MCC in several ways. The throat diameter
has been increased 11 percent from 10.305
to 10.883 inches, which allows a decrease
in chamber pressure by 9 percent. The
contour of the chamber also changes and
the throat plane is shifted downstream from
the injector face by 0.7 inch (Figure 6). The
• Throat area increased by 11%
- Reduces operating chamber pressure (Pc) by 9%
New Throat Plane
Old Throat Plane
New Contour
O_k,L Enhanced Coo ing
Geometry
Old Throat Diameter New Throat Diameter
10.305 in.
-" 140 in "-
14.7 in. ---
I
10.883 in.
Figure 6. Large Throat Main Combustion Chamber (LTMCC)
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increased throat dimension permits an
increase in the number of coolant channels
to 430 from the current 390 and the
accompanying reduction in hot wall
thickness. These changes reduce the
operating temperature of the hot wall by
approximately 60-to-100 R, increasing its
life by about 200 percent. This lowered
temperature serves to reduce the occurrence
of pin-hole leaks and channel cracks. The
increased number of coolant channels also
increases the magnitude of hot-wall-to-
channel-wall bond area, thus lowering
operating bond stress by 17 percent, which
increases the structural margin of these
bonds by 32 percent over its current level.
In addition to the functional changes
described above, investment cast manifolds
with wrought liners are used instead of the
welded construction of these components
in the current MCC. The cast manifolds
significantly reduce the number of welds
(from 79 to 26) in the manifolds, and those
that do remain are fully inspectable. Cost
of manufacturing and fabrication time also
decreases.
The introduction of the LTMCC has
impacted other engine components (see
Table 12). These relatively minor impacts
require some redesign and recertification
of the affected component. The Low
Table 12. SSME Operating Condition Comparison at 104% RPL
Parameter
Thrust
Chamber Pressure
Mixture Ratio
Suction Oxidizer Rowrate
Suction Fuel Rowrate
Total Suction Fiowrate
Ibf
psia
O/F
Ibs/sec
ibs/sec
Ibs/sec
Current
Phase-II
MCC
488352
3126
6.011
926.59
154.15
1080.74
Isp sec 452.9
psia
psia
rpm
R
psia
rpm
R
psia
4341
7306
27938
1335
6348
34936
1694
HPOTP Main Pump Discharge Pressure
Boost Pump Discharge Pressure
shaft Speed
Turbine Discharge Temperature
HPFTP Pump Discharge Pressure
Shaft Speed
Turbine Discharge Temperature
Oxidizer Praburner Pressure
Fuel Prebumer Pressure
LPOTP Discharge Pressure
shaft Speed
LPFTP Discharge Pressure
shaft Speed
5187
psia 5200
psia 422
rpm 5107
psia
rpm
295
15804
LTMCC
488352
2843
6.011
925.43
153.96
1079.39
453.4
4O84
7190
27658
1201
6037
34328
1550
48O3
Delta
-9.0%
-5.9%
-1.6%
-1.0%
-10.1%
-4.9%
-1.7%
-8.5%
-7.4%
4784 -8.0%
401 -5.0%
5005 -2.0%
293
15740
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Pressure Oxidizer Turbopump (LPOTP)
inducer has to be redesigned to change the
blade incidence angle. This redesign has
been initiated and a development unit has
been water-flow- tested and hot-fired on the
TI'B engine. While the ATP I-IPOTP was
designed to be compatible with both the
LTMCC and the current MCC, the current
HPOTP would require a redesign of the
main inducer to reduce cavitation and a
change to the preburner stage diffuser to
eliminate vane stall characteristics that occur
at the lower power levels.
Use of the LTMCC lowers the
combustion chamber pressure by 9 percent
at 104 percent RPL. Thrust is maintained
by the change in the operating points of the
turbopumps. A comparison of the operating
conditions and margins of the engine with
the LTMCC with those with the current
MCC is given in Table 12. In general, with
the LTMCC, operation of the engine at 104
percent RPL is less stressful than operating
the current engine at 100 percent RPL.
Similarly, operating the engine with the
LTMCC at 109 percent RPL is equivalent
to the current engine operating at 104
percent RPL (Figure 7).
While the LTMCC increases the
operating margins as noted above, the
reduction in chamber pressure and area ratio
would result in a reduction of 2.2 seconds
in specific impulse and consequent loss in
vehicle payload capability. To reduce this
loss, it is planned to eliminate the acoustic
cavities and their associated coolant flow,
reduce chamber film coolant flow, and use
the chamber in combination with the Two-
Duct Powerhead, which deletes the main
injector baffles (cf., Table 13). Experience
with such changes to the combustion system
in hydrogen/oxygen systems and test results
300
t_
rr 2OO
I--
t_
t_
.c 100
¢-
LU
d_
0
E
_"_ LTMCC
Current/ _ Margin
LTMCC
_f-'__ Margin
Current/ _
In-Flight- _ "_= tom
Shutdown _8.":3)
I I I
100 104 109
Command Power Level (%)
Figure 7. Current SSME MTBF
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Table 13.
Two-Duct Powechead Improvements
• Increased hot gas flow area
• Improved contour for hot gas flow
• Eliminated center transfer duct
• Improved main injector flow shield
design
• Shortened prebumer injector dements
• Improved structural integrity of coolant
ducts and liquid oxygen Inlet manifold
• Eliminated 76 welds
• Removed main injector baffles
of the LTMCC technology program indicate
that removing combustion stabilizing devices
from the system is acceptable.
The removal of the MCC injector
baffles produces an improvement in MCC
cooling. The baffles were originally included
to prevent combustion instability from
propagating. Although testing to date has
shown adequate stability, thorough stability
testing during completion of the development
and certification programs is prudent.
To date, there are four LTMCCs in
various stages of manufacture and assembly.
LTMCC unit 6001 was installed on Engine
0208, test run for 26 starts, and accumulated
3,716 seconds of operating time. It was also
installed on Engine 0217 and tested for 830
seconds in two runs. On Engine 0208,
injector baffles and acoustic cavities were
removed and subjected to eight "bomb" test
sets to determine the sensitivity of this
configuration to combustion disturbances.
All of these tests demonstrated rapid
recovery from the disturbance created by
the bomb, recovering within 6 milliseconds,
which is essentially the same as that of the
original configuration. The criterion for
acceptable recovery is 28 milliseconds.
Other aspects of performance were reported
to have met or exceeded expectations. The
condition of the chamber after 28 tests was
excellent with no indication of cracking or
pin-hole leaks.
Improvement of operating margins
associated with the LTMCC may lead to the
availability of the more desirable abort mode
options. The operating margin of the SSME
at FPL with the LTMCC is comparable with
that of the current engine at 104 percent
RPL. In the event of an engine shutdown,
advancing the throttle to FPL makes possl_ole
a greater time span for the abort-to-orbit
mode and a reduction of the time when
RTLS mode is required by about 20 to 30
seconds. More detailed study is required.
TWO-DUCT POWERHEAD
The current SSME powerhead (referred
to as the Phase 1I powerhead), shown in
Figure 8, is an assembly of eight major parts.
One part, the HGM, serves as the structural
base for mounting the MCC and its injector,
the two preburner injectors, the HEX, and
the two high-pressure turbopumps. The
current HGM has three ducts connecting
the high-pressure fuel turbine discharge
annulus and the MCC injector dome. These
ducts yield non-uniform velocity and pressure
profiles of the hot gas flow entering the
MCC injector dome. This causes severe
dynamic loading on the MCC injector liquid
oxygen (LOX) posts. The flow distortion
also causes a rather large pressure drop
through the ducts, resulting in a loss in
performance. Also, the significant lateral
pressure differential created across the
HPFTP adds to its structural loads, especially
on the "sheet metal" parts. The HGM has
very thick walls, about 2-1/2 inches, and
many welds are used to make the assembly.
Many of the items in the CIL that are
associated with the powerhead are of
26
PHASE II POWERHEAD
I
. '.L-- . . 1
HPFTP MCC HPOTP
PHASE II ENGINE
Figure 8. Phase H Powerhead
concern because they are exacerbated by
the poor flow conditions it creates.
During the early 1980's, a program was
initiated to modify the powerhead to mitigate
or eliminate these problems. This program
introduced a new component referred to as
the Phase II+ powerhead (two-duct
powerhead). The most significant features
of the redesign are indicated in Figure 9,
with the three circular cross-section ducts
replaced by two elliptical cross-section ducts.
This and other modifications significantly
improved flow uniformity, decreased
turbulence levels and pressure drops, and
improved the ruggedness and hence the
reliability of the assembly. A summary
of the changes is given in Table 13,
indicating the components affected. For
example, the flow area of the MCC injector
flow shields have been increased by 34
percent and the dynamic loads on the LOX
posts are reduced by 16 percent. The
HPFTP transverse pressure gradient is
reduced by 60 percent, reducing this part
of its structural load significantly. Changes
to the liquid oxygen inlet elbow and tee have
increased both their high- and low-cycle
fatigue design life by an order of magn/tude.
The number of welds in the assembly has
been reduced by 24 percent.
Testing to date indicates a need to fine-
tune the film cooling flows for the MCC
walls to eliminate blanching and erosion.
This is in process. Formal certification of
the powerhead will coincide with that of the
singie-tube HEX and is scheduled to start
in late 1992 and end in 1994.
PERFORMANCE IMPACTS
The forementioned improvements will
impact Shuttle system performance. In the
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Figure 9. Powerhead (Comparison)
case of engine Isp, as shown in Table 14,
certain losses and gains axe attributable to
the various changes. Regarding the
reduction of leakage in the new MCC, the
optimistic estimate is that there will be a
net gain of 0.95 seconds. Conservatively,
the estimated net effect on Isp would be a
gain of about 0.35 seconds or a net gain in
payload capability of about 350 pounds.
Estimated effects of the proposed
structural changes involved are indicated
in Table 15. If all improvements are
incorporated, the weight of an engine wiU
increase 685 pounds or 2050 pounds per ship
set. The overall effect of the changes (using
the conservative effect of Isp) is an
approximate 1700-pound decrease in payload
capability. This is the "price" of increasing
the safety and reliability of the SSME and
is well worth it.
PRIORITIES
There is no simple, mathematically
rigorous way to establish priorities among
the major changes to the SSME described
in the preceding paragraphs. Any attempt
to assign priorities based on a mathematical
scoring system would be highly subjective.
The Team's consensus was that priorities
should be based on the evaluation of each
item's impact on engine safety and reliability.
This led to the following priority groupings:
Priority I:
Priority II:
Single-tube HEX
ATP HPOTP
LTMCC
ATP HPFTP
Two-Duct Powerhead
Within each grouping, the items are
presented in priority order. No other major
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Table 14. SSME Large Throat MCC Engine Performance
Specific Impulse Change Due to Large Throat MCC Incorporation
Delta (Sec)
Large Throat MCC
Area/Chamber Pressure
Acoustic Cavity Row Elimination
Boundary Layer Coolant Hole Row Reduction
MCC Total:
-2.2
+0.5
+10
-0.7 Seconds
Phase II + Powerhead
Baffleless Main Injector +1.0
Total Specific Impulse Change +0.3 Seconds (95% Confidence)
Expected Additional Gain Due to MCC Leakage +0.05 to +0.65
Table 15. Effects of Improvement on SSME Weight
MCC
Standard (today) MCC Weight
Rocketdyne Proposed Production Large Throat
Turbomachinery
HPOTP
Rocketdyne (today)
ATD (expected flight weight)
HPFTP
Rocketdyne (today)
ATD (expected flight weight)
Powerhead
Phase-II (today, 3-duct)
Phase-II + (2-duct, baffleless, Single-Tube HEX)
470 Ibm
620 Ibm
575 Ibm
741 Ibm
770 Ibm
989 Ibm
1267 Ibm
1417 Ibm
+ 150 Ibm over today
+ 166 Ibm over today
+219 Ibm over today
+150 Ibm over today
Total Delta (per engine): +685 Ibm
modifications are under development or
consideration at this time.
CERTIFICATION
Figure 10 shows the current schedule
for development and certification of the
proposed improvements. It is apparent from
the figure that the sequence of availability
of the improvements is not in concert with
the priorities just presented. Also, because
of the hardware-related factors, there will
be multiple certifications of some
improvements. For example, the ATP
HPOTP will first be certified with the
current MCC and will have to be re-certified
with the LTMCC. Also, the resulting
configuration will only fly for a very few
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FY 96
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FY97 FY98
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FY 99
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Figure 10. Current Implementation Schedule for SSME Improvements
years before it is replaced. Engine-level
testing is a very expensive activity,
approximately $1500/second, with at least
40,000 seconds required for certification.
Therefore, it would be advisable to examine
modifying current plans to determine if a
more logical and effective program can be
devised. Such an examination should
consider the possibility of reorganizing the
program so as to create a "block change";
that is, one incorporating all the changes
at once to create a new model of the SSME.
This would require a very detailed
assessment of all the factors involved in such
a programmatic alteration. Among the
factors to be considered is the number of
engine test stands needed in this process--it
being possible that, with a different program
plan, all three facilities might not be needed
and the concurrent expenditure could be
avoided. Intuitively, such a block change
approach should be less expensive in the
long run and reduce duplicative testing and
certify the block in the ultimate flight
configuration only. This may delay some
certifications and require expediting others.
OTHER OPERATIONAL CONCERNS
During the course of the Team's review,
other engine operational concerns surfaced
that demand attention before they become
major safety risk factors; these are discussed
below.
"Pops". Occasionally, the oxidizer pre-
burner experiences sudden, short-_ed rapid
combustion phenomena, possibly detonations,
evidenced by sudden spikes in engine-
mounted accelerometer readings. These
have been called "pops," some of which have
resulted in accelerometer readings as high
as 10,000 g. Until recently, such large pops
have occurred only after engine cutoff had
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beeninitiated, generallyabout 2.3seconds
into the process. Recently, popsof 11,000
to 12,000 g have been experienced during
engine start-up in contrast to the 1,000 g
previously experienced.
Based on post-event inspections, a
criterion has been developed that states that
pops yielding 6,000 g or less requires no
special action; those above that magnitude
require a "flat face" inspection of the injector
plate to ensure that no physical deformation
has occurred and that none of the brazed
joints have been damaged. To test the
validity of this criterion, a preburner injector
that had been deformed by 0.085 inch is
being kept in the test program.
There are several concerns about pops:
their unpredictability, lack of understanding
of the phenomenon, and lack of knowledge
as to what is the upper bound of the
disturbance. Attempts are being made to
investigate making small changes in the
injector manifolds to minimize the
accumulation of propellant behind the
faceplate, a suspect mechanism. Also,
modifications to valve timing during
shutdown are being investigated in an effort
to minimize the fuel backflow resulting from
an imbalance between chamber pressure
and supply pressure during the transient.
Finally, although bomb testing and operating
experience indicate that the engine is
inherently stable, the magnitude of the
disturbance during pops might be sufficient
to trigger combustion instability, especially
ff the stabilizing devices like acoustic cavities
and main injector baffles are removed.
Obviously, a continuing analytical and
experimental effort to understand and
eliminate or control the phenomenon is
indicated.
Instrumentation. A source of
continuing concern has been the failure of
flight sensors used for redlines. Although
the systems employ redundant sensors and
logic to exclude readings from failed units,
the failure experience is not salutary. Should
a number of sensors in one redline
instrument system fail, an mmecessa_ engine
shutdown and abort could occur. This is
especially true of the temperature
instruments used to measure turbine
discharge temperatures of the high-pressure
turbopumps. Of necessity, the sensing
element of the thermistors is a very fine wire
that is easily broken. Over the years, a
series of design modifications of the sensor
assembly has had moderate success in
increasing ruggedness, but failures continue
to occur. Also, extreme care in manufacture
is required to produce a usable device. Not
only must development of the current type
sensor continue but an alternate, more
rugged technique should be sought for
sensing temperatures.
Valve Actuators. The hydraulic
actuators that operate the propellant control
valves are critical parts of the engine system.
The hydraulic segment of the actuators is
fully redundant and is backed up with a
pneumatic system that is designed to allow
a safe shutdown in the event of a multiple
failure in the hydraulic system. Prior to the
Challenger accident, two on-pad aborts were
associated with loss of redundancy in the
actuator system. The Launch Commit
Criteria require that all redundant systems
be operating for a launch. Design changes
were incorporated in both the actuator and
the hydraulic fluid systems to improve
reliability. Since then, an actuator hangup
has occurred during a component checkout.
The cause of the malfunction was
determined to be galling between the spool
and sleeve that transfers the valve from
hydraulic to pneumatic control in the event
of multiple failure in the hydraulic pan of
the actuator. Fixes for this problem are
being actively sought.
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Sustaining Engineering. Similar
problems will continue to arise as operating
experience accumulates. This is true of all
propulsion systems, including aircraft gas
turbine engines and automotive engines.
Each program must, therefore, maintain an
active and eompetent sustaining engineering
team to investigate all anomalies as they
occur and develop any necessary corrective
action.
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V. CONCLUSIONS
Based on its review of the history, status
and plans of the Space Shuttle Main Engine
(SSME) program, the SSME Assessment
Team concludes the following:
. It is safe to continue to fly with the
current engines provided that the
current precautions and procedures
such as special inspections, life limits,
and configuration control continue to
be implemented in an expert,
disciplined, and vigilant manner.
. The safety and reliability of the SSME
can be improved substantially by
incorporating changes that increase the
inherent ruggedness and operating
margins of components, thus reducing
reliance on people and processes.
° All of the major safety and reliability
improvements currently in development
should be implemented as they respond
to known major concerns. They are
listed in priority order based on
estimated impact on engine safety and
reliability:
Priority I: Single-Tube Heat Exchanger
Alternate High-Pressure Oxidizer
Turbopump
Large-Throat Main Combustion
Chamber.
Priority II: Alternate High-Pressure Fuel
Turbopump
Two-Duct Powerhead.
,
.
,
.
.
Implementation of these changes should
permit a less restrictive use of thrust
in the event of an abort, thus permitting
an improvement in the choice of abort
mode options.
These changes should be certified as
soon as possible. The certification and
implementation should be performed
as a block change rather than a serial
change as specified in the current plan.
This should eliminate duplicate
certifications and ensure that the
changes take effect in the configuration
that will fly.
Although the Team did not possess the
degree of expertiserequired to perform
an in-depth of analysis for a valid cost
comparison between the two
approaches, it concluded, on the basis
of the experience of its members, that
the block change approach would be
more economical than serial changes.
Anomalies and new phenomena (e.g.,
"pops" and sensor malfunctions) are
expected to continue to occur or be
discovered as operating and test
experience is gained. All such
occurrences must continue to be
investigated thoroughly and require a
competent sustaining engineering
activity.
Although not specifically addressed in
the body of this report, the program
aimed at developing improved
fabrication and inspection techniques
for the SSME should be continued and
encouraged.
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VI. RECOMMENDATIONS
Based on its conclusions, the Team
recommends:
. Certification and implementation of
all of the major safety and reliability
improvements given in Conclusion
Number 3.
. Implementation of proposed changes
as a block change. Conduct an in-
depth evaluation of cost, schedule, and
technical impacts of the block change
o
approach versus the current serial plan;
include in the study long-term effects
on costs such as recurring costs.
Continuation of the practice of
thorough investigation of all anomalies
that occur in flight and tests such as
"pops"; the development and
implementation of corrective actions;
and maintenance of an effective
sustaining engineering activity.
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APPENDIX A
NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
MULTIYEAR AUTHORIZATION ACT OF 1992
Am_c 2_ 19_2_mmltted to the Committm tithe Whok Ho_e m tim Btata af
the U_oa md _ to be printed
i
Mr. BlowN, from the Committee on &_iance. Space, and
Techn_ozy, subn_tted the fon_
REPORT
[To aeeompmsy HR. 4864]
[IndudinS omt _t, d th, _ a_tm_t Omm]
The Committee on Science, Spac_ and Technology, to whom, was
referred the hill (H.IL 4864) to authorize appropriationa to the Na-
tional Aeronauticl and Space Adm£aktration for reaearch and de_
velopmmst, apace fight, control and data .mmmn,_tf_ti_. eon-
sm:ction of facilitie_ research and .pregram manat, ement, and In-
spector General, and for other purpmm, havinll considered the
_Jl_. report favorllbly __" w_th an amm_dm_-Ttt and lq_om-
mend that the bill, u amended, do pama
fi4-f_
A-1
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ating, margins within the SSME which is generally rocognized as
the rmkieet element of the Space Shuttle.
The Wide Diameter _t and the Alternative Fuel Turbopump
should be pursued as ral_dly as pmaiblo. Accordingly, the Commit-
tee e.nco...ur_..H_ in the ,tron._t possible terms to undertake
these initiatives as quickly as pmsible.
The Committm requests that the Aerospace Safety Advimry
Panel (ASAP) create a temporary task force of propuhdon ex_
to .conduct a thorough ammment of the Space Shuttle Main
Ensme _). The Committee bellevm that this temporary task
fOrCe _should include pro_pulJ/on oxperto dniwn from _
elsewhere to augment the propuunon experm who are atmaay au-
filiated with the J_AP.
The Committee request_ that the temporary task force: 1) assma
the risks .tha.,t the SSME prom to the safe operation of' the
Shuttle; 2) identify and evaluate safety improvements that could
eliminate or reduce them rtskJ; and 8) recommend a set of prior-
itiN that the task force believes should be followed on implement-
in8 specific improvements.
Basically, the Committee wishes to receive an unbiased ammm-
ment that could answer questions auch at the following. How m_fe
is the SSME? Is it safe enough? If not,-what imprevemenhs need to
be made? How quickly should these improvements be b_..ught into
the operational_ventory? V4hat will be the coat of making then
improvemontS7 What are the likely risks and comtequoncm if thee.
improvements are not made? etc.
The Committee would like to receive a final report from the tern-
porary task force no later than February 1, 1998:
The Committee directs that the NASA Administrator provide the
temporary task force with whatever: (1) data; (2). access to facilities,
records, analyses, and personnel; and (3) financial and administra-
tive support that may be required for the temporary task force to
comply With this Congressional request.
Section JO_bXR._---SSx_ShuuleOpemt_o_
Prmddent's request for fleeal year 1998 and mtismttm fo_ mul_m-
qu__.tym_
1_eeseslel, ele *el ,.,eeeei_... e..O..H..........*.**....eo.oe* ,reel 61 *lelelHee_oe6e e* e le**_,neRe_ •
Committee moommm_d_tion:
.
&1IS,Z)0,000
&]_r_oo,ooo
3,105,200.000
8,142,_00,000
8,180._00,000
Committe_ authorization recommendation..
sThin section authorizes f_q,105,200,000 in fiscal year 1998,
,142,500,000 in fiscal year 1.994, and _,180,2.00,000 in fiscal year
1995 for Space Shuttle Operations. The authorization for .fl_.,year
1993 re p_.ruents a decrease of $10,000,000 below the Preaident s re-
quest. This decrease repremmts a pneral reduction in Research
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